ABSTRACT Existing spectrum-sharing schemes either allow the secondary-network users (SUs) to utilize the spectrum when primary-network users (PUs) remain idle, or require the SUs to coordinate with the PUs, causing signaling overhead. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic spectrum-sharing scheme, which enables the SUs and PUs to utilize the spectrum simultaneously, without compromising the quality of service (QoS) of the PUs and ensuring reduced signaling overhead. We formulate a multi-priority noncooperative power-control game by considering a scenario where multiple small cell base stations belonging to either the primary network or secondary network utilize the available spectrum resources at the same time. The base stations are empowered to adjust their transmit powers in an automated manner based on measured interference, until their transmit powers are stabilized. As a key idea, a game parameter, dynamic price coefficient, is designed to give the primary network priority over the secondary network for accessing the spectrum. We determine appropriate bounds for the game parameters to ensure the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game. Furthermore, we propose a novel dual-mode solution to reduce the real-time signaling overhead between the networks, by minimizing the information exchange during the game required to reach an equilibrium point. Extensive simulation results are presented to prove the convergence of the game to a Nash equilibrium, along with a throughput performance analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of mobile data applications in recent years has resulted in a dramatically increased demand for radio spectrum [1] , [2] . Legacy spectrum allocation approaches divide the spectrum into pre-allocated exclusively licensed bands for primary networks resulting in inefficient usage of the spectrum when it is not being used by the primary networks. This under-utilization of the spectrum results in an artificial spectrum scarcity for secondary networks [3] . The spectrum regulatory authorities in the European Union (EU) [4] , [5] and the United States [6] , [7] are hence promoting the development of innovative spectrumsharing schemes that ensure efficient spectrum utilization while maintaining the quality of service of both primary network users and secondary network users.
The coexistence of primary network users (PUs) and secondary network users (SUs) while sharing available spectrum resources poses a number of challenges. Firstly, this arrangement must not degrade the quality of service (QoS) of primary network users, i.e. the secondary network operation must not cause harmful interference to the primary network operation [8] . To address this challenge, effective interference management and power-control schemes are needed so that the primary network users can maintain their QoS while allowing the secondary network users to exploit the surplus network capacity [9] . Secondly, contemporary spectrumsharing schemes require coordination between the network users, to enable information exchange and ensure enforcement of spectrum-sharing rules [1] . Thus, any information exchange between the systems must avoid an excessive signaling overhead to prevent real-time delays.
To address the first challenge, recent research on spectrum sharing promises to maintain QoS of primary network users based on different assumptions. For instance, it has been assumed in the literature that secondary network users access the spectrum when primary network users are inactive or when only secondary network users are considered the players (decision-makers) in a game [10] - [12] . Saadat et al. [13] and [14] assume that secondary user operation in the spectrum licensed to primary network users does not affect the QoS of the primary network users. Moreover, while the objective of interference mitigation and hence maintaining the QoS was achieved in [15] , the presented scheme required instant information exchange between the systems which results in signaling overhead. The work presented in [16] and [17] analyzes a non-cooperative powercontrol game where a number of femtocells coexist to use the available frequency channels while having the same priority of accessing the spectrum, which affects the QoS of the primary network users.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
To address these gaps, we present a spectrum-sharing scheme which enables the primary network users to maintain their desired QoS during the spectrum-sharing process, while minimizing the signaling overhead. In this regard, we make the following contributions in this paper:
• We design a multi-priority non-cooperative game where all the network nodes act as players, and each node decides its individual transmit power in an automated manner adapting to the interference measurement until its power is stabilized;
• We design a game parameter, dynamic price coefficient, as the weight of the price of the transmit power, which can be dynamically adjusted by each primary network node to ensure that the interference received at the node remains below a predefined interference threshold, guaranteeing that the QoS of its users is not affected;
• We propose a dual-mode solution which ensures that the game does not require continuous coordination to reach an equilibrium, reducing the real-time signaling overhead;
• We present extensive simulation results to prove the convergence of the game to a Nash equilibrium, along with a comprehensive throughput performance analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present a survey of related work. In Section III, we develop the system model. In Section IV, we propose the non-cooperative power-control game for collaborative spectrum sharing, followed by an analysis of the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game. In Section V, we provide simulation results. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
With regards to spectrum sharing in two-tier networks comprising macrocells and femtocells, Han et al. [9] designed an optimal power allocation scheme for uplink transmission where the utilities of user equipments are maximized in a hierarchical game, assuming that the macrocell user equipments apply their strategies first, followed by the femtocell user equipments who apply their power allocation strategies in response. Kang et al. [18] presented a distributed power allocation scheme for spectrum sharing in a network by formulating a Stackelberg game to maximize the utilities of a central macrocell and a number of femtocells. The Stackelberg equilibrium was achieved through an effective distributed interference price bargaining algorithm in a game where the macrocell acts as the leader to apply its strategy first (by setting an interference price); based on its strategy, the followers (femtocells) apply their strategies (by deciding their power). In [8] , a scheme was presented to increase the spectral utility of a two-tier network comprising small cells and macrocells, where small cells either provide offloading services to macrocells, or earn licenses to operate in the frequency spectrum of macrocells in reward. A Nash bargaining solution was used to determine an energy-efficient balance between the offloading and licensing roles of small cells. However, it was assumed that all small cells act as a single entity instead of acting as independent players having individual utilities. To sum up, in [8] , [9] , and [18] , it was assumed that femtocells use the same spectrum as macrocells in a two-tier network, whereas in our design, we consider a scenario where femtocells (or small cells) do not share the spectrum with macrocells. Instead, we consider the coexistence of a number of small cells serving either the primary network users or the secondary network users, while using available spectrum resources, and all the players in our design choose their strategies at the same time.
Nadkar et al. [10] presented an overlay spectrum-sharing scenario for a multi-user multi-channel cognitive radio network (CRN), where the SUs maximize their throughput in a power-control game, and the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are investigated. However, it was assumed that the SUs use the spectrum when the PUs remain idle. In [11] , a non-cooperative exact potential game was proposed to jointly allocate power and frequency resources among SUs. However, during the game formulation, the assumptions that PUs remain inactive, that each player is aware of opponent player strategies and that knowledge of channel gains is available to all players can be challenging in practice. Among contemporary spectrum-sharing schemes, a modified Licensed Shared Access (LSA) architecture was presented in [13] to support an evolutionary game, where the payoff of the licensees (SUs) converges towards an equilibrium point. The game model in [13] was further extended in [14] , enabling the proposed LSA architecture to cope with crossborder interference through backup strategies of the domestic licensees during the game. However, in both [13] and [14] the incumbent (PU) aspect of the LSA architecture is not discussed in detail.
In [19] , a spectrum-sharing scheme was presented as an energy-efficient non-cooperative power-control game, where each player selfishly selects its transmit power to maximize its own spatial sum energy-efficiency. The existence, uniqueness and inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium were presented. However, all participating players had the same priority during the game and each system aimed to maximize energy-efficiency instead of throughput. In [20] , a non-cooperative power-control game based on a signalto-interference-ratio dependent pricing scheme was modeled to satisfy user goals such as fairness, aggregate throughput or their trade-off. A unique and Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium was achieved; however, the assumption that the users inform the centralized node about their path gains and their maximum transmit power throughout the game can be challenging in practice. In [21] , a dynamic spectrum leasing approach was presented using a non-cooperative powercontrol game, where the PUs select an interference cap on the total interference they can withstand. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game with linear receiver implementation were investigated, and it was assumed that the player set includes only one PU as player along with multiple SUs. Yang et al. [22] presented distributed power control for CRNs by formulating a cooperative Nash bargaining power-control game where interference power constraints were introduced to protect the PUs from harmful interference caused by SUs. Dall'Anese et al. [23] discussed spectrum sharing for CRNs in a framework where the interference experienced by the PUs is controlled through power-control algorithms considering channel uncertainty. In our previous work [16] and [17] , a non-cooperative powercontrol game was presented where the femtocells independently adjust their transmit power until it stabilizes while using available frequency channels; however a static price coefficient was used to adjust the weight of the price of the transmit power. The static price coefficient remained constant for all base stations in a coverage area, which were given equal priority for accessing the spectrum. However, no mechanism was presented to ensure that knowledge of the game parameters can be provided to the players.
To sum up, in existing schemes the spectrum sharing between secondary network users and primary network users is enabled based on various assumptions such as primary network users remaining inactive, each player being aware of opponent player strategies, or by requiring coordination among the players throughout the game causing signaling overhead. In contrast, we propose a game-theoretic spectrumsharing framework in this paper, where a set of small cell base stations (BSs) belonging to primary and secondary networks share the same spectrum resources simultaneously. To ensure that the spectrum-sharing process does not affect the QoS of the primary network users, we formulate a multi-priority game where the primary network users get the first right to improve or maintain their QoS. We ensure this by designing a game parameter, dynamic price coefficient, which gives the primary network BSs priority over the secondary network BSs for accessing the spectrum. By introducing an interference constraint, it is ensured that the secondary network users do not cause harmful interference to the primary network users. We show that the game can converge to a unique Nash equilibrium without requiring continuous coordination among the BSs during the game.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present the system model, depicting a scenario where the primary network and the secondary network coexist to share the available spectrum resources simultaneously. In practice, the primary network can receive financial compensation for sharing the spectrum resources licensed to it with the secondary network. However in this paper, we focus on the QoS aspect of spectrum sharing, assuming that the financial compensation aspect of spectrum sharing is already negotiated between the networks. The primary network is given priority to access the spectrum so that the primary network users can maintain their quality of service. In the proposed spectrum-sharing model, the game is played in a non-cooperative manner where each player (BS) can take independent decisions based on global information provided to it by a game controller. The game controller coordinates the game by managing the participating BSs and provides them with the common information needed to play the game. As will be shown in Section IV-C, the values of the game parameters need to be exchanged once to initialize the game. However, the overall coordination of the players with this game controller is minimized as, once the game is initialized, the players (BSs) are empowered in such a way that each BS can iteratively determine its optimal transmit power until an equilibrium point is reached without interacting with the game controller. Thus, it is ensured that the players do not need to exchange information multiple times to avoid realtime delays in practical scenarios.
We consider a coverage area having |D m | base stations (players) as shown in Fig. 1 . D m is the set of BSs participating in the non-cooperative power-control game where the i th base station (i = 1, · · · , |D m |) iteratively adjusts its transmit power. It is considered that the BSs are divided into two subsets: a primary subset η serving the primary network users, and a secondary subset µ serving the secondary network users. Hence, |η| is the number of BSs serving the primary network users, and |µ| is the number of BSs serving the secondary network users (|D m | = |µ|+|η|). The participating BSs do not share any information with each other directly and can independently select their transmit powers.
During the proposed game, we assume that a channel k having bandwidth W , within the given spectrum band is shared among BSs serving the users of both networks, as each BS i ∈ D m iteratively adjusts its transmit power while using the channel for transmission. For illustration convenience, we consider that each BS serves only one user at a time. Hence, a BS user equipmentî receives signals from its serving BS i and other BSs j (j ∈ D m , j = i) where the signals received from other BSs act as interference. For the k th channel, the channel gain from BS j to userî is given by
where K j,î is the path-loss coefficient from BS j to userî, d j,î is the distance between BS j and userî, 
IV. COLLABORATIVE SPECTRUM SHARING A. PROPOSED NON-COLLABORATIVE GAMING FRAMEWORK
In this section, we formulate a new non-cooperative powercontrol game for collaborative spectrum sharing among the BSs serving either the primary network users or the secondary network users. Each BS i (i = 1, · · · , |D m |) repetitively adjusts its transmit power P x i ∈ [0, P max ] until it stabilizes, where x identifies which network the BS is serving, and is replaced by c to represent the primary network and l to represent the secondary network. P −i collects the transmit powers of the rest of the BSs and P max is the upper limit on the transmit power for each BS.
We formulate a surplus function to represent the achieved throughput and caused interference for each of the small cells. Since the interference caused by a cell has a direct relation with the transmit power it chooses, the transmit power of each cell represents the cost of striving for higher throughput by that cell. This way, each cell does not have an incentive to choose an excessively high power, which reduces the amount of interference it can cause [16] . Thus, the surplus function, comprising a utility function and a cost function, of this non-cooperative power-control game for small cells, can be formulated for the i th
where
ensures that the proposed non-cooperative power-control game does not converge to an inefficient Nash equilibrium, acts as a cost for using higher transmit powers and restricts BS i ∈ D m from transmitting using a very high power for convergence [16] , [17] . The signal-to-interference ratio (SIR)
The interference measured by user equipmentî being served
. R x i represents the minimum target SIR threshold for the user being served by the i th BS (i = 1, · · · , |D m |). An adjustable parameter α m is used to modify the convergence speed to reach the equilibrium state of the game. The use of the arctan() function in the utility function ensures the asymptotic convergence of the utilities of all players to a constant value, i.e. π/2. Moreover, the use of the arctan() function acts as a limiting factor on excessively high transmit power, as each BS does not have any incentive to aim for an excessively high SIR, which in turn puts a limit on the interference that can be caused. Using arctan() ensures that the power-control game has a concave structure, thus the BSs can independently adjust their transmit powers in a decentralized manner once in the iteration-mode (as shown in Section IV-C), and attain convergence to an equilibrium [16] .
The dynamic price coefficient θ x i represents the individual penalty of excessively high transmit power for the i th BS (i = 1, · · · , |D m |), and is defined as
where θ c and θ l are the weights of the prices of the transmit power for the primary network BSs and secondary network BSs respectively. d f is a discount coefficient provided by the game controller to the primary network BSs to reduce the cost of their transmit powers. Traditionally interference power constraints are used to protect the primary network users from harmful interference caused by the secondary network users, i.e. it is required that the interference experienced by the primary network users due to the secondary network operation must stay below a predefined threshold [22] , [23] . We define the interference power constraint for BS i ∈ η serving the primary user equipmentî asĨ
. Z c i ∀i ∈ η is the maximum interference power acceptable at the i th primary network BS and B is Boltzmann's constant. The predefined threshold to quantify the tolerable interference temperature for primary network users is defined as T i and its value is determined by each primary network BS i ∈ η such that the user being served by the BS can achieve its minimum target SIR. Re-arranging the terms, the interference power constraint is rewritten as Unlike the system model proposed in [16] and [17] , where a static price coefficient was used to adjust the weight of VOLUME 5, 2017 the price of the transmit power, we have designed a dynamic price coefficient which ensures that the priority users, i.e. the primary network users are rewarded for sharing their spectrum. The dynamic price coefficient ensures that the interference power constraint is always satisfied as the received interference at the primary network BSs is minimized adaptively to enable the PUs to reach their minimum target SIR (throughput). The non-priority users (SUs) receive a static discount coefficient as given in (1) . In other words, the interference temperature is implicitly included and can be satisfied by adaptively adjusting the dynamic price coefficient θ x i ∀i ∈ η at the primary network BSs until the instantaneous interference temperature gets below the threshold. By this means, instantaneous QoS degradation can be avoided for the PUs. As given in (1), each primary network BS i ∈ η compares the received interference with the maximum interference power limit during the game, and decides the updated value of θ x i ∀i ∈ η to resume the game. This allows each primary network BS to minimize the received interference for improving the SIR and the resulting throughput achieved by its users, without any coordination among other BSs or the game controller. In this way, the instantaneous interference temperature is always satisfied for the primary network BSs once the game reaches the equilibrium in an automated manner.
The empowerment of the BSs to learn and adapt to the traffic conditions, by fine-tuning the dynamic price coefficient, is a critical aspect of our design. In traditional dynamic spectrum access systems, multiple parameters need to be updated and adjusted simultaneously (e.g. transmit power, coding scheme, sensing algorithm, etc.), which requires complex interactions among these factors and their impact on the radio frequency (RF) environment. In our design, the spectrum access systems, i.e. the BSs are empowered to dynamically adjust their transmit powers. Moreover, these BSs need to interact with the game controller only once (as will be shown in section IV-C), to exchange information for calculation of α m , θ c and θ l as they are empowered to adjust θ x i ∀i ∈ D m themselves adaptively. This way, we simplify the complicated challenge of learning in a network of spectrum access systems where each system not only has to update its parameters according to the RF environment but also needs to estimate the actions of other systems. In our model, each player does not need to estimate the parameters selected by other players, rather it can adjust its transmission parameters independently based on its own traffic conditions and interference measurements.
In order to find the optimal transmit power for BS i, we differentiate S x i (θ x i , P x i , P −i ) with respect to P x i to obtain
The optimal solution for the i th BS (i = 1, · · · , |D m |), denoted by P x * i , is either the solution making (2) equal to zero or on the boundary of the solution region, as given by
and the corresponding SIR is given by
Each BS can calculate its optimal transmit power adaptively using (3) until it stabilizes and reaches an equilibrium point. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium can be achieved by carefully selecting the initial region of the game as discussed in the next section.
Taking the second-order partial derivative of S x i (θ x i , P x i , P −i ) with respect to P x i , we get
which is negative, meaning that S x i is continuous and concave w.r.t. P x i (i = 1, · · · , |D m |).
B. ANALYSIS OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF THE NON-COOPERATIVE GAME
In this section, we provide an analysis of the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game. The existence of the Nash equilibrium of the proposed noncooperative game is proved using the Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan Theorem [24] , by noticing that: 1) S x i is continuous and concave w.r.t. P x i . 2) S x i is continuous w.r.t. P −i . 3) [P x i ,P −i ] is compact and convex. In order to prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative power-control game, we use Rosen's criterion [25] to equivalently prove that S x i is diagonally strictly concave with respect to P x i and P −i across the region P x i ∈ (0, P max ] ∀i. This can be proved if the symmetric matrix (U m + U T m ) (where T denotes the transpose of the matrix) can be shown as negative definite, where U m defined as (6) , as shown at the top of the next page, is evaluated at the optimal transmit powers P x * i (i = 1, · · · , |D m |), and β i and ω i are given by
where x = c or x = l represents how |η| BSs serving the primary network users and |µ| BSs serving the secondary network users are arranged for i = 1, · · · , |D m |.
. . .
We proceed to prove the negative definiteness of the symmetric matrix (U m + U T m ). In this regard, the expression for
, is given as
which can be rewritten as given in (7), as shown at the top of this page. To ensure the negativity of the left-hand side (LHS) of (7), we must ensure that
which, by substituting β i and ω i (i = 1, · · · , |D m |) in, can be rewritten, as given in (8), as shown at the top of this page. It must be ensured that the selection of α m and θ x i (i = 1, · · · , |D m |) is appropriate so that y T (U m + U T m )y ≤ 0 for any y, as shown in (7). We note that the LHS of (8) 
we can adjust α m at the right-hand side of (8) to preserve the inequality. By obtaining appropriate values of α m and θ x i (i = 1, · · · , |D m |) which satisfy (8) and (9), we can ensure that y T (U m +U T m )y ≤ 0 for any y, as shown in (7). This guarantees that (U m + U T m ) is negative definite, which in turn implies that S x i is diagonally strictly concave over [P x i , P −i ] in the unbounded region P x i ∈ (0, +∞) ∀i. By Rosen's criterion, this ensures that there is a unique Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game [25] .
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED GAME
During our proposed non-cooperative power-control game, the participating BSs are empowered to take independent decisions about their transmit powers without excessive coordination with one another or the game controller. However, in order to ensure that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium, all BSs require particular parameter information to calculate their optimal transmit powers. Specifically, each BS i ∈ D m needs information about α m and either θ l or θ c along with d f to calculate its optimal transmit power P * i . We implement this game by designing two modes: an initialization-mode in which the BSs exchange necessary parameter information and an iteration-mode in which the BSs iteratively adjust their optimal transmit powers until an equilibrium point is achieved. The tasks executed in each mode are presented in Fig. 2 . ∀i ∈ D m within the specified ranges given by (9) and determines suitable values of α m , d f , θ l and θ c which remain constant throughout the iteration-mode. Eventually, these values need to be provided to all BSs, before the start of the iteration-mode. Hence, the initialization-mode is concluded when α m , d f , θ l and θ c are returned to relevant BSs so that they can calculate their transmit powers in the iteration-mode.
2) ITERATION-MODE
Recall from (3) that each BS i ∈ D m serving userî can select its optimal transmit power, using the values ofĨ i,î , G k i,î , and R x i , all of which are available to it; the additionally needed information, i.e. the values of α m and either θ l or θ c along with d f , is provided by the game controller after the initialization-mode. Using this information, BS i ∈ D m calculates P x * i for each upcoming iteration until P x * i is stabilized. α m and θ x j (j ∈ µ) remain constant for all iterations. However, each BS i ∈ η serving the primary network users updates θ x i based on r c i and d f , for each iteration. Once each BS i ∈ D m finalizes the transmit power, this information is then used to compute an updated γ x i and the resulting throughput. As proved earlier in Section IV-B, by satisfying Rosen's criterion for selection of the game parameters, a unique Nash equilibrium of the game can be achieved. To determine an acceptable initial region of the game, in the initialization-mode the game controller computes values of α m , d f , θ l and θ c which satisfy (8) and (9) . Using these values in the iteration-mode, all the BSs choose their best-response strategies, i.e. their optimal powers iteratively to suit the traffic conditions, until the individual transmit powers of the BSs stabilize and converge to Nash equilibrium points. Thus, by selecting the game parameters in the initialization-mode following Rosen's criterion as proposed, the game converges to a unique Nash equilibrium in the iteration-mode.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we set parameter values to carry out MATLAB-based computer simulations, and provide a discussion of the results. 
where W is the bandwidth of the channel and γ x i is the SIR. The minimum target throughput, which is computed using the minimum target SIR, for the primary network users is set as 7 Mb/s unless otherwise stated. The value of the path-loss exponent α is set as 3.5, appropriate for an urban environment.
B. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig. 5, Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 , we provide a convergence analysis of the non-cooperative powercontrol game, and perform simulations by setting |D m | = 18, |η| = 9, |µ| = 9. Fig. 3 shows the convergence of the average surplus of the primary network BSs and the secondary network BSs to their respective equilibrium points as the game progresses. It can be observed that in both cases, after 10 iterations the average surplus reaches a stabilized value (equilibrium point), which is below the theoretical maximum of π/2 as expected. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the convergence of the individual transmit powers of the primary network BSs and the secondary network BSs to distinct equilibrium points respectively, as the game progresses, where the minimum target throughput for the primary network users is set as 4 Mb/s. It can be observed that after 10 iterations, the individual transmit powers of all the BSs reach stabilized values (equilibrium points). Note that the individual transmit power of each BS can converge to a distinct equilibrium point, as its power gets stabilized at a point depending on the interference it receives. Nevertheless, all the users being served by the primary network BSs are still able to meet their minimum target throughput, i.e. 4 Mb/s; see Fig. 6 . Fig. 8 shows that the dynamic price coefficient enables the primary network BSs to adaptively minimize the received interference and ensure that the interference power constraint is always satisfied throughout the iteration-mode, as the measured interference values of the primary network BSs converge to distinct equilibrium points. Fig. 9 provides a demonstration of the effect of varying |η|, the number of primary network BSs in the coverage area on achieved average throughput of users of both networks at the equilibrium stage. We consider a scenario when |µ| = 9 secondary network BSs continuously utilize the spectrum resources, and set the minimum target throughput of PUs as 7 Mb/s. The figure shows that as |η| increases the average throughput achieved by the secondary network users decreases gradually. When |η| = 0, the secondary network users achieve a high average throughput (18 Mb/s) as there are no priority BSs (primary network BSs) in the coverage area. As |η| increases, the average throughput achieved by the secondary network users decreases due to an increase in the number of priority BSs. Moreover, it is also observed that, when the number of primary network BSs increases, the average throughput achieved by the PUs also decreases due to the competition among them. However, the primary network users are still able to achieve their minimum target throughput by adjusting the dynamic price coefficient, unlike the secondary network users, whose average throughput decreases after a certain level of congestion in the coverage area. Fig. 10 provides a demonstration of the effect of varying |µ|, the number of BSs serving the secondary network in a coverage area on achieved average throughput of the primary network users at the equilibrium stage, by considering a scenario when |η| = 9 primary network BSs continuously utilize the spectrum resources. As |µ| increases the received average SIR of the primary network users is degraded, in turn degrading the average throughput achieved by the primary network users, which begins to approach their minimum target throughput, i.e. 7 Mb/s, as shown in the figure. Overall, when a BS joins (or leaves) the network, the SIR gets degraded (or improved) for existing users being served by the existing BSs, due to increased (or reduced) interference respectively. In both cases, the game controller re-calculates the parameter values, i.e. the game restarts in the initialization-mode and the game controller broadcasts the parameter values (α m , θ c , d f and θ l ) so that the network nodes can determine their optimal powers in a decentralized fashion and converge to a new equilibrium point.
In Fig. 11 , a throughput analysis is presented by considering a congested scenario, where the number of primary network BSs is equal to the number of secondary network BSs, i.e. |D m | = 18, |µ| = 9, |η| = 9. The figure provides an overview of the variation in the achieved average throughput of users from both networks as the game progresses and it is observed that, the average throughput achieved by the primary network users increases as the game progresses, resulting in a decrease in the average throughput achieved by the SUs.
The benefit of using the dynamic price coefficient is highlighted in Fig. 12 by considering a congested scenario where the number of primary network BSs is equal to the num- ber of secondary network BSs, i.e. |D m | = 18, |µ| = 9, |η| = 9. The figure demonstrates the effect of varying the minimum target throughput of the primary network users on the achieved average throughput of users of both networks at the equilibrium stage. We observe that an increase in the minimum target throughput of primary network users results in a decrease in the average throughput achieved by the secondary network users, whereas the average throughput achieved by the primary network users increases as desired. To elaborate the advantage provided by the dynamic price coefficient, the solid line in the figure shows the average throughput achieved by the PUs if they use a static price coefficient proposed in [17] (instead of the dynamic price coefficient proposed in our approach). Thus, when the static price coefficient is used, the primary network users are only able to achieve a constant average throughput regardless of the target. On the other hand, it can be noted that, as the minimum target throughput of the PUs increases, the dynamic price coefficient enables them to achieve their throughput targets. In comparison, it is observed that the average throughput achieved by the secondary network users starts degrading once the minimum target throughput of the primary network users reaches 5 Mb/s. The dynamic price coefficient is therefore critical in enabling the primary network users to meet a varying minimum target throughput, and hence enables them to maintain their QoS.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a game-theoretic spectrum collaboration framework for next-generation mobile networks, where the primary network and the secondary network share spectrum resources through a multi-priority non-cooperative power-control game. The participating base stations, serving either primary network users or secondary network users, dynamically adjusted their transmit powers by measuring received interference. We introduced a game parameter, dynamic price coefficient, that can be adjusted to allow the game to converge to a unique Nash equilibrium, and proved the convergence theoretically and through simulations. We proposed a dual-mode solution which minimizes the infor-mation exchange during the game required to reach an equilibrium point, reducing the real-time signaling overhead. Our simulations showed that the dynamic price coefficient can be adjusted by the primary network such that the primary network users can achieve their minimum target throughput and maintain their QoS.
